Creating a winner’s curse via jump bids
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F16%3A00463434" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/16:00463434 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0187-z" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0187-z</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0187-z" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10058-016-0187-z</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Creating a winner’s curse via jump bids
Original language description
We show that jump bids can be used by a bidder to create a winner’s curse and preserve an informational advantage that would otherwise disappear in the course of an open ascending auction. The effect of the winner’s curse is to create allocative distortions and reduce the seller’s expected revenue. Two novel features of equilibrium jump bids are derived. First, the jump bid may fail to hide completely the value of the common value component. Second, a bidder with a higher type might jump bid less frequently than a bidder with a lower type.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—
Classification
Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
—
Result continuities
Project
—
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2016
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Review of Economic Design
ISSN
1434-4742
e-ISSN
—
Volume of the periodical
20
Issue of the periodical within the volume
3
Country of publishing house
DE - GERMANY
Number of pages
14
Pages from-to
173-186
UT code for WoS article
000381296100001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-84959338693