Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F16%3A00461905" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/16:00461905 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/00216208:11640/16:00468737
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12243" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12243</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12243" target="_blank" >10.1111/ecoj.12243</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids
Original language description
We analyse a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats. We focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact dropout values of the opponents who exit the auction. We show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
—
Result continuities
Project
—
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2016
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Economic Journal
ISSN
0013-0133
e-ISSN
—
Volume of the periodical
126
Issue of the periodical within the volume
594
Country of publishing house
GB - UNITED KINGDOM
Number of pages
19
Pages from-to
1484-1502
UT code for WoS article
000380719300007
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-84979573846