Manipulating information revelation with reserve prices
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F19%3A00525465" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/19:00525465 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.133.0087" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.133.0087</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.133.0087" target="_blank" >10.15609/annaeconstat2009.133.0087</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Manipulating information revelation with reserve prices
Original language description
We introduce a novel motive for the use of a reserve price as an instrument to raise auction revenues in ascending auctions. The effect that we stress is of inducing coarser information aggregation. The reserve price may prevent information revelation because bidders cannot precisely observe at which price other bidders leave the auction. In simple settings where valuation functions are not symmetric, this may increase the expected revenue of the auction. To illustrate this motive, we exhibit an example in which the use of a reserve price increases revenue even though there are always at least two bidders active for prices higher than the reserve price.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>SC</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the SCOPUS database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50201 - Economic Theory
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2019
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Annals of Economics and Statistics
ISSN
2115-4430
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
133
Issue of the periodical within the volume
March
Country of publishing house
FR - FRANCE
Number of pages
6
Pages from-to
87-91
UT code for WoS article
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EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85085017840