Second-chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F23%3A00575063" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/23:00575063 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12448" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12448</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12448" target="_blank" >10.1111/1756-2171.12448</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Second-chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default
Original language description
Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow “second-chance” offers (the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price) and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces bids, (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default, (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders known to default with a positive probability. Our experiments show that the economic forces identified in the theoretical model are important enough to have predictive power for bidder behavior.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2023
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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