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Oligopoly dynamics with isoelastic demand: The joint effects of market saturation and strategic delegation

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F22%3A10250095" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/22:10250095 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077922002673" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077922002673</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2022.112057" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.chaos.2022.112057</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Oligopoly dynamics with isoelastic demand: The joint effects of market saturation and strategic delegation

  • Original language description

    In the framework of a Cournot oligopoly game with isoelastic demand, we examine the simultaneous presence of both market saturation and strategic delegation. Although these two (realistic) aspects have already been considered in the literature each on its own, we aim at deepening their joint interactions when matched together in oligopolistic competition. In addition, we admit the possibility that delegation activities actuated by firms to weaken or even exclude competitors from the market may cease if undertaken by successful players, which thus regain their pure profit maximizing behavior. In this context, a limited market saturation level (positively) influences the effectiveness of delegation strategies and, at the same time, can sustain equilibrium configurations for the winning (monopolistic) firm even under the isoelastic market structure. Through local stability analysis, we show how the combination of strategic delegation with market saturation contributes to determine the equilibrium number of active players and the local asymptotic stability of the (economically relevant) equilibrium. Moreover, non-equilibrium dynamics reveal the presence of periodic cycles along which a firm is active while its competitors alternatively exits and enters the market. We show why these interesting scenarios are due to the joint interplay between strategic delegation and market saturation.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    50200 - Economics and Business

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/GA20-16701S" target="_blank" >GA20-16701S: Hybrid Evolutionary Games and Economic Applications</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2022

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    Chaos, Solitons &amp; Fractals

  • ISSN

    0960-0779

  • e-ISSN

    1873-2887

  • Volume of the periodical

    158

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    May

  • Country of publishing house

    US - UNITED STATES

  • Number of pages

    10

  • Pages from-to

    112057

  • UT code for WoS article

    000800366500010

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-85128306298