Vice Epistemology of Believers in Pseudoscience

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15210%2F21%3A73608923" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15210/21:73608923 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/filozofia/?q=sk/filozofia.2021.76.10.1" target="_blank" >http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/filozofia/?q=sk/filozofia.2021.76.10.1</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.10.1" target="_blank" >10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.10.1</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Vice Epistemology of Believers in Pseudoscience

Original language description

The demarcation of pseudoscience has been one of the most important philosophical tasks since the 1960s. During the 1980s, an atmosphere of defeatism started to spread among philosophers of science, some of them claimed the failure of the demarcation project. I defend that the more auspicious approach to the problem might be through the intellectual character of epistemic agents, i.e., from the point of view of vice epistemology. Unfortunately, common lists of undesirable character features are usually based on a priori reasoning, and therefore might be considered artificial or too vague. When we base our position on contemporary behavioural sciences, we can see that the epistemic character of believers in pseudoscience is for the most part determined by two related factors. Firstly, these epistemic agents show a higher level of cognitive laziness. By this I mean an inability or unwillingness to engage in reflective thinking and a reluctance to account for counterevidence. Secondly, they yield more easily to metacognitive overconfidence. This can be broadly understood as so-called “knowledge illusion”, the inability to recognize one’s own intellectual limits. The deficiency usually stems from a misunderstanding of the division of cognitive labour and of the agent’s role in epistemic society. I find the proposed epistemological approach to pseudoscience crucial. Only if we understand the descriptive aspects of the problem, can we think of normative solutions to it.

Czech name

—

Czech description

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Type

J_SC - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the SCOPUS database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Project

<a href="/en/project/GA20-06678S" target="_blank" >GA20-06678S: Perspectives of Paternalism in a Democratic Society: Lessons from Behavioral Sciences for Political Philosophy</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year

2021

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

FILOZOFIA

ISSN

0046-385X

e-ISSN

—

Volume of the periodical

76

Issue of the periodical within the volume

10

Country of publishing house

SK - SLOVAKIA

Number of pages

17

Pages from-to

735-751

UT code for WoS article

000747758300001

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85123754793