Second best efficiency and the English auction
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F11%3A00364945" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/11:00364945 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Second best efficiency and the English auction
Original language description
We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the bidders? incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskin?s (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)
Others
Publication year
2011
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Games and Economic Behavior
ISSN
0899-8256
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
73
Issue of the periodical within the volume
2
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
11
Pages from-to
496-506
UT code for WoS article
000296545200013
EID of the result in the Scopus database
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