Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F13%3A00399708" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/13:00399708 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/00216208:11640/13:00423393
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.09.001" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.09.001</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.09.001" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.09.001</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining
Original language description
In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game ? la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
—

Project
<a href="/en/project/GAP402%2F12%2F0666" target="_blank" >GAP402/12/0666: A Dynamic Analysis of Trade Policy Formation</a><br>
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2013
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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