Manipulation of procurement contracts: evidence from the introduction of discretionary thresholds
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F17%3A00475676" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/17:00475676 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/00216208:11640/17:00482079
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150511" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150511</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150511" target="_blank" >10.1257/pol.20150511</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Manipulation of procurement contracts: evidence from the introduction of discretionary thresholds
Original language description
We present evidence of how policies that create opportunities to avoid open competition in procurement lead to the manipulation of procurement values. We exploit a policy reform in which public bodies were given the autonomy to preselect potential contractors below newly defined discretionary thresholds. Manipulation is revealed through bunching of procurements just below the thresholds in construction works and services, and to a lesser degree, in goods. Among manipulated contracts, we document a threefold increase in the probability that procurements are allocated to anonymous firms, which can hide their owners. This sorting violates assumptions behind regression-discontinuity designs.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—
Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/TD020099" target="_blank" >TD020099: Empirical Models of Manipulations in Public Procurement: Evidence from the Czech Republic</a><br>
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2017
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
American Economic Journal-Economic Policy
ISSN
1945-7731
e-ISSN
—
Volume of the periodical
9
Issue of the periodical within the volume
2
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
23
Pages from-to
293-315
UT code for WoS article
000400280000010
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85018448388