Sequential vote buying

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F22%3A00561148" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/22:00561148 - isvavai.cz</a>

Alternative codes found

RIV/00216208:11640/22:00568749

Result on the web

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105529" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105529</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105529" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jet.2022.105529</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Sequential vote buying

Original language description

To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from q committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy passes or paid up front. With transfer promises, the policy passes in equilibrium when the leader's gain from the policy is larger than the sum of the losses of the q members least opposed to the policy. Under non-unanimity rule, if the members are patient enough, the payments are close to zero when the policy passes. Whenever the policy passes in equilibrium with transfer promises, it also passes with up-front payments, at a cost close to zero. Moreover, there are scenarios when the policy passes with up-front payments, but not with transfer promises. Hence the leader is better off and the members are worse off with up-front payments than with transfer promises. The leader does not necessarily buy the votes of those least opposed. The opposition structure most challenging to the leader involves homogeneous committees. Our results provide an explanation for several empirical regularities.

Czech name

—

Czech description

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Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Project

—

Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2022

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Journal of Economic Theory

ISSN

0022-0531

e-ISSN

1095-7235

Volume of the periodical

205

Issue of the periodical within the volume

October

Country of publishing house

US - UNITED STATES

Number of pages

30

Pages from-to

105529

UT code for WoS article

000859008700001

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85136705271