Separable Network Games with Compact Strategy Sets
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F21%3A00353771" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/21:00353771 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_3" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_3</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_3" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_3</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Separable Network Games with Compact Strategy Sets
Original language description
A separable network game is a multiplayer finite strategic game in which each player interacts only with adjacent players in a simple undirected graph. The utility of each player results from the aggregation of utilities in the corresponding two-player games. In our contribution, we extend this model to infinite games whose strategy sets are compact subsets of the Euclidean space. We show that Nash equilibria of a zero-sum continuous network game can be characterized as optimal solutions to a specific infinite-dimensional linear optimization problem. In particular, when the utility functions are multivariate polynomials, this optimization formulation enables us to approximate the equilibria using a hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations. We present a security game over a complete bipartite graph in which the nodes are attackers and defenders, who compete for control over given targets.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
D - Article in proceedings
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/EF16_019%2F0000765" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000765: Research Center for Informatics</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2021
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Article name in the collection
Decision and Game Theory for Security
ISBN
978-3-030-90369-5
ISSN
1611-3349
e-ISSN
0302-9743
Number of pages
20
Pages from-to
37-56
Publisher name
Springer Nature Switzerland AG
Place of publication
Basel
Event location
Praha
Event date
Oct 25, 2021
Type of event by nationality
WRD - Celosvětová akce
UT code for WoS article
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