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Drone e-ID Vulnerability to GNSS Interference

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21260%2F24%3A00375819" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21260/24:00375819 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://doi.org/10.23919/NTCA60572.2024.10517822" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.23919/NTCA60572.2024.10517822</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/NTCA60572.2024.10517822" target="_blank" >10.23919/NTCA60572.2024.10517822</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Drone e-ID Vulnerability to GNSS Interference

  • Original language description

    Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are a key source of position, navigation, and timing for Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This holds true for the new e-ID technology as well, which is compulsory for drones operating in the SPECIFIC category since 2024. Both portable and embedded e-ID devices are a new addition to the market as a reaction to the new legislation. However, these electronic visibility enablers may be susceptible to GNSS interference, possibly leading to denial of service or false position and time information being reported. To assess the vulnerability of these newly introduced e-ID devices, two of them were subjected to a series of GNSS interference attacks. The testing included jamming-only attacks, spoofing-only attacks and attacks combining jamming with subsequent spoofing. The results show the impact of all these attacks on the position and time information, the number of satellites in view and other parameters. Additionally, the results highlight the differences between a GNSS-only e-ID device and an e-ID device with both GNSS and inertia sensors. Finally, the potential of using accuracy indicators in e-ID messages for GNSS interference detection is discussed.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    D - Article in proceedings

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    20304 - Aerospace engineering

Result continuities

  • Project

  • Continuities

    S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Others

  • Publication year

    2024

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Article name in the collection

    New Trends in Civil Aviation: Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on New Trends in Civil Aviation 2024

  • ISBN

    978-80-01-07181-6

  • ISSN

    2694-7854

  • e-ISSN

  • Number of pages

    6

  • Pages from-to

    207-212

  • Publisher name

    České vysoké učení technické v Praze

  • Place of publication

    Praha

  • Event location

    Praha

  • Event date

    Apr 25, 2024

  • Type of event by nationality

    WRD - Celosvětová akce

  • UT code for WoS article

    001223424800014