The Absence of Evil in The Republic : A Possible Dialogue Between Plato and Hannah Arendt
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F11%3A10104792" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/11:10104792 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
The Absence of Evil in The Republic : A Possible Dialogue Between Plato and Hannah Arendt
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The question of the Holocaust inevitably requires the thematization of the question of evil, and consequently a reconsideration of the limits of the philosophical tradition, that is, the tradition of the separation between the theoretical and the practical sphere. In Plato''s epistemology, this separation resulted in the radical impossibility of making evil an object of knowledge. If knowledge as such is a result of dialogue/dialectic, as demonstrated in the majority of Plato''s dialogues, then to knowsomething means to know why it is good. Evil as such thus subverts the very process of dialogue. Not only is evil impossible as an issue in dialogue, but dialogue itself is impossible wherever evil is on the scene. Evil is against the very inclination ofreason and rationality to explain, understand and finally to justify things. Thus to say that something is evil means to say that it should never happen, in other words, to say that there is no acceptable reason for that to happen.
Název v anglickém jazyce
The Absence of Evil in The Republic : A Possible Dialogue Between Plato and Hannah Arendt
Popis výsledku anglicky
The question of the Holocaust inevitably requires the thematization of the question of evil, and consequently a reconsideration of the limits of the philosophical tradition, that is, the tradition of the separation between the theoretical and the practical sphere. In Plato''s epistemology, this separation resulted in the radical impossibility of making evil an object of knowledge. If knowledge as such is a result of dialogue/dialectic, as demonstrated in the majority of Plato''s dialogues, then to knowsomething means to know why it is good. Evil as such thus subverts the very process of dialogue. Not only is evil impossible as an issue in dialogue, but dialogue itself is impossible wherever evil is on the scene. Evil is against the very inclination ofreason and rationality to explain, understand and finally to justify things. Thus to say that something is evil means to say that it should never happen, in other words, to say that there is no acceptable reason for that to happen.
Klasifikace
Druh
O - Ostatní výsledky
CEP obor
AB - Dějiny
OECD FORD obor
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Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
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Návaznosti
N - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z neverejnych zdroju
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2011
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů