An Aristotelian Argument Against Bare Particulars

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F12%3A10107546" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/12:10107546 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

An Aristotelian Argument Against Bare Particulars

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The text provides an Aristotelian-inspired argument against the thesis that particulars do not have any (non-trivial) de re necessary properties. This anti-essentialist claim is addressed in the form it takes within the implicit ontology of the Transparent Inten-sional Logic (TIL) of Pavel Tichý, the most developed logical formalism based on Fregean fundaments up to date. The author sets out to show that given the reality of "accidental change" (or any contingent variation across time or possible worlds), there must be tropes or particular accidental forms - quite irrespectively of any assumptions concerning the nature of universals. Since the tropes must ultimately differ essentially, it follows that there are many essentially distinct natural kinds of particulars, so that insistence on essential sameness of substances turns out as unwarranted. The article concludes with some general thoughts concerning the relationship between ontology and logic. The author defends the view that our

Název v anglickém jazyce

An Aristotelian Argument Against Bare Particulars

Popis výsledku anglicky

The text provides an Aristotelian-inspired argument against the thesis that particulars do not have any (non-trivial) de re necessary properties. This anti-essentialist claim is addressed in the form it takes within the implicit ontology of the Transparent Inten-sional Logic (TIL) of Pavel Tichý, the most developed logical formalism based on Fregean fundaments up to date. The author sets out to show that given the reality of "accidental change" (or any contingent variation across time or possible worlds), there must be tropes or particular accidental forms - quite irrespectively of any assumptions concerning the nature of universals. Since the tropes must ultimately differ essentially, it follows that there are many essentially distinct natural kinds of particulars, so that insistence on essential sameness of substances turns out as unwarranted. The article concludes with some general thoughts concerning the relationship between ontology and logic. The author defends the view that our

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GAP401%2F11%2F0906" target="_blank" >GAP401/11/0906: Možnosti realistické epistemologie tváří v tvář novověké kritice</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic

ISBN

978-3-86838-146-7

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

113-122

Název nakladatele

Ontos Verlag

Místo vydání

Frankfurt-Heusenstamm

Místo konání akce

Praha

Datum konání akce

30. 6. 2010

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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