Soul and Incorporeality in Plato

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F18%3A10388576" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/18:10388576 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=WkDMvcCP3D" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=WkDMvcCP3D</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Soul and Incorporeality in Plato

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article takes a closer look at what Plato&apos;s dialogues tell us about the incorporeality of the soul as one of the well-established Platonic doctrines, on a par with the soul&apos;s immortality and its self-moving nature. What motivates the proposed rereading is Plato&apos;s timidity in describing the soul, human or not, as being entirely without body of any kind. The aim of the article is not to contest the obvious fact that Plato treats souls as essentially distinct from bodies, but to understand why the assumption of incorporeality receives no detailed discussion of its own. One possible answer is that such a theoretically rigorous discussion is always less important to Plato than his emphasis on the variety of actions and experiences ascribed to the soul both here and in the afterlife. While having an essential moral dimension that connects to the soul&apos;s activity of thinking, these actions and experiences contribute to the description of the soul as a fully individual agent, akin to that of a person. To highlight the immortality of this agent, it is more opportune for Plato to start from various facets of the soul&apos;s natural self-motion, while leaving aside possible arguments in favor of the soul&apos;s full ontological bodilessness. In any case, the Platonic soul is introduced as a fundamental part of reality. Its natural agency can therefore be tackled separately from its explicit ontology. By this means, the agency-akin to human agency-that is attributed to the soul can retain its provisional ontological neutrality.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Soul and Incorporeality in Plato

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article takes a closer look at what Plato&apos;s dialogues tell us about the incorporeality of the soul as one of the well-established Platonic doctrines, on a par with the soul&apos;s immortality and its self-moving nature. What motivates the proposed rereading is Plato&apos;s timidity in describing the soul, human or not, as being entirely without body of any kind. The aim of the article is not to contest the obvious fact that Plato treats souls as essentially distinct from bodies, but to understand why the assumption of incorporeality receives no detailed discussion of its own. One possible answer is that such a theoretically rigorous discussion is always less important to Plato than his emphasis on the variety of actions and experiences ascribed to the soul both here and in the afterlife. While having an essential moral dimension that connects to the soul&apos;s activity of thinking, these actions and experiences contribute to the description of the soul as a fully individual agent, akin to that of a person. To highlight the immortality of this agent, it is more opportune for Plato to start from various facets of the soul&apos;s natural self-motion, while leaving aside possible arguments in favor of the soul&apos;s full ontological bodilessness. In any case, the Platonic soul is introduced as a fundamental part of reality. Its natural agency can therefore be tackled separately from its explicit ontology. By this means, the agency-akin to human agency-that is attributed to the soul can retain its provisional ontological neutrality.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF16_019%2F0000734" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000734: Kreativita a adaptabilita jako předpoklad úspěchu Evropy v propojeném světě</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Eirene

ISSN

0046-1628

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

54

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1-2

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

43

Strana od-do

53-95

Kód UT WoS článku

000469524400003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85064389110