Moods and Emotions

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F20%3A10418595" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/20:10418595 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003084013-29" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003084013-29</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003084013-29" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003084013-29</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Moods and Emotions

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

I contend that moods and emotions are neither internal mental states, nor hard-wired reactions occurring in our brains. From the phenomenological point of view, they are experientially manifest as wholes that can be only ex post decomposed in what seem to be - once we adopt an objectivizing perspective - their components, such as cognitive appraisals, inner feelings, motor reactions, physiological arousals etc. Against the strong impulse to decompose moods and emotions into such empirically identifiable components, phenomenology points to the impossible task of reconstructing our affective life in its full sense out of determinate component-entities and provides the means to grasp emotional experience simultaneously in its primary indistinction and implicit articulation. In short, my contribution on the one hand presents the original insights brought by phenomenology into the unified structure of emotional experience and, on the other, deals with the relevance of affective life and its investigation for phenomenology itself.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Moods and Emotions

Popis výsledku anglicky

I contend that moods and emotions are neither internal mental states, nor hard-wired reactions occurring in our brains. From the phenomenological point of view, they are experientially manifest as wholes that can be only ex post decomposed in what seem to be - once we adopt an objectivizing perspective - their components, such as cognitive appraisals, inner feelings, motor reactions, physiological arousals etc. Against the strong impulse to decompose moods and emotions into such empirically identifiable components, phenomenology points to the impossible task of reconstructing our affective life in its full sense out of determinate component-entities and provides the means to grasp emotional experience simultaneously in its primary indistinction and implicit articulation. In short, my contribution on the one hand presents the original insights brought by phenomenology into the unified structure of emotional experience and, on the other, deals with the relevance of affective life and its investigation for phenomenology itself.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF16_019%2F0000734" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000734: Kreativita a adaptabilita jako předpoklad úspěchu Evropy v propojeném světě</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy

ISBN

978-0-367-53999-3

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

304-315

Počet stran knihy

840

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

London

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

—