THE ROLE OF INSTINCT IN DAVID HUME'S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN REASON
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F20%3A10420307" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/20:10420307 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=7Pm86eSOuu" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=7Pm86eSOuu</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2020.0277" target="_blank" >10.3366/jsp.2020.0277</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT IN DAVID HUME'S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN REASON
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
This article investigates the role of instinct in Hume's understanding of human reason. It is shown that while in the Treatise Hume makes the strong reductive assertion that reason is 'nothing but' an instinct, in the First Enquiry the corresponding statement has been modified in several ways, rendering the relation between instinct and reason more complex. Most importantly, Hume now explicitly recognises that alongside instinctive experimental reasoning, there is a uniquely human intellectual power of intuitive and demonstrative reason that is not itself an instinct. At first sight it may look as if this intellectual reason, that is capable of grasping 'relations of ideas', is not even grounded in instinct but is a thoroughly non-natural element in human nature. On closer analysis, however, it is shown that intellectual reason, in its apprehension of 'abstract' and general relations, is dependent on language - the use of 'terms' - and that language itself is grounded in instinctive associations of ideas. Thus, Hume's overall view is that even the intellect is an outgrowth of instinct and his conception of human nature is, therefore, shown to be fully naturalistic. Yet this naturalism can still make room for the 'exceptionalism' of human mathematical thought, which has no counterpart in the animal kingdom where language is lacking.
Název v anglickém jazyce
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT IN DAVID HUME'S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN REASON
Popis výsledku anglicky
This article investigates the role of instinct in Hume's understanding of human reason. It is shown that while in the Treatise Hume makes the strong reductive assertion that reason is 'nothing but' an instinct, in the First Enquiry the corresponding statement has been modified in several ways, rendering the relation between instinct and reason more complex. Most importantly, Hume now explicitly recognises that alongside instinctive experimental reasoning, there is a uniquely human intellectual power of intuitive and demonstrative reason that is not itself an instinct. At first sight it may look as if this intellectual reason, that is capable of grasping 'relations of ideas', is not even grounded in instinct but is a thoroughly non-natural element in human nature. On closer analysis, however, it is shown that intellectual reason, in its apprehension of 'abstract' and general relations, is dependent on language - the use of 'terms' - and that language itself is grounded in instinctive associations of ideas. Thus, Hume's overall view is that even the intellect is an outgrowth of instinct and his conception of human nature is, therefore, shown to be fully naturalistic. Yet this naturalism can still make room for the 'exceptionalism' of human mathematical thought, which has no counterpart in the animal kingdom where language is lacking.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/GA19-07384S" target="_blank" >GA19-07384S: Překonávání dualismu mysli a hmoty v novověkém myšlení</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2020
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Journal of Scottish Philosophy
ISSN
1479-6651
e-ISSN
—
Svazek periodika
18
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
3
Stát vydavatele periodika
GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska
Počet stran výsledku
16
Strana od-do
273-288
Kód UT WoS článku
000600544700004
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85090642952