Revisiting abstraction and idealization : how not to criticize mechanistic explanation in molecular biology

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F22%3A10441536" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/22:10441536 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=0buALpJ.fV" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=0buALpJ.fV</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00453-1" target="_blank" >10.1007/s13194-022-00453-1</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Revisiting abstraction and idealization : how not to criticize mechanistic explanation in molecular biology

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Abstraction and idealization are the two notions that are most often discussed in the context of assumptions employed in the process of model building. These notions are also routinely used in philosophical debates such as that on the mechanistic account of explanation. Indeed, an objection to the mechanistic account has recently been formulated precisely on these grounds: mechanists cannot account for the common practice of idealizing difference-making factors in models in molecular biology. In this paper I revisit the debate and I argue that the objection does not stand up to scrutiny. This is because it is riddled with a number of conceptual inconsistencies. By attempting to resolve the tensions, I also draw several general lessons regarding the difficulties of applying abstraction and idealization in scientific practice. Finally, I argue that more care is needed only when speaking of abstraction and idealization in a context in which these concepts play an important role in an argument, such as that on mechanistic explanation.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Revisiting abstraction and idealization : how not to criticize mechanistic explanation in molecular biology

Popis výsledku anglicky

Abstraction and idealization are the two notions that are most often discussed in the context of assumptions employed in the process of model building. These notions are also routinely used in philosophical debates such as that on the mechanistic account of explanation. Indeed, an objection to the mechanistic account has recently been formulated precisely on these grounds: mechanists cannot account for the common practice of idealizing difference-making factors in models in molecular biology. In this paper I revisit the debate and I argue that the objection does not stand up to scrutiny. This is because it is riddled with a number of conceptual inconsistencies. By attempting to resolve the tensions, I also draw several general lessons regarding the difficulties of applying abstraction and idealization in scientific practice. Finally, I argue that more care is needed only when speaking of abstraction and idealization in a context in which these concepts play an important role in an argument, such as that on mechanistic explanation.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA19-04236S" target="_blank" >GA19-04236S: Zjednodušující předpoklady a nekauzální vysvětlení</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

ISSN

1879-4912

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

12

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

1-20

Kód UT WoS článku

000765764100003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85126212203