The Activity of the Soul and the Causality of its Objects : Gonsalvus of Spain and the Influence of Peter John Olivi

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Activity of the Soul and the Causality of its Objects : Gonsalvus of Spain and the Influence of Peter John Olivi

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

One of the central debates of 13th-14th century philosophical psychology concerns the causal role of the soul, in its cognitive and appetitive powers, in contrast with its relevant objects, especially corporeal objects outside of the soul. In recent literature, Peter John Olivi (1248-1298) has often been brought up in this debate, characterized as having a particularly radical view: the soul&apos;s cognitive and appetitive powers are the proper efficient causes from which even their most basic acts are produced, while, in contrast, corporeal objects are insufficient to produce any direct effect on the spiritual soul. In this paper I want to consider two sorts of issues that can be raised concerning Olivi&apos;s position. First, philosophically, there are concerns over how Olivi could take such a seemingly extreme view: surely the relevant objects must play some causal role in explaining why, e.g., I am cognizing this object in front of me and not any other. Second, historically, it can be rather difficult to trace Olivi&apos;s influence, especially positively, given how extreme his view is oft presented (sometimes even by himself) and general controversies surrounding his name as well. As I will argue, by examining Olivi alongside another, rather understudied figure, Gonsalvus of Spain (~1255-1313), both of the above issues can be alleviated. Gonsalvus was a student of Olivi, eventually to become General Minister of their Franciscan order, who was even &quot;charged&quot; by a critical party in his day of following certain views of Olivi. As I take it, Gonsalvus indeed follows Olivi on this topic at hand, though he takes a more diplomatic approach. In short, in this paper, I argue that both Olivi and Gonsalvus still allow for a broadly efficient causal role for the objects of cognition and volition, albeit as secondary or &quot;sine qua non&quot; causes, and in this way it is consistent that the cognitive and appetitive powers are still the primary efficient causes of their respective acts. Gonsalvus, interestingly, takes a more conciliatory tone than Olivi, but I take this to show that Olivi could have made his view appear less radical if that were his interest (it just wasn&apos;t).

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Activity of the Soul and the Causality of its Objects : Gonsalvus of Spain and the Influence of Peter John Olivi

Popis výsledku anglicky

One of the central debates of 13th-14th century philosophical psychology concerns the causal role of the soul, in its cognitive and appetitive powers, in contrast with its relevant objects, especially corporeal objects outside of the soul. In recent literature, Peter John Olivi (1248-1298) has often been brought up in this debate, characterized as having a particularly radical view: the soul&apos;s cognitive and appetitive powers are the proper efficient causes from which even their most basic acts are produced, while, in contrast, corporeal objects are insufficient to produce any direct effect on the spiritual soul. In this paper I want to consider two sorts of issues that can be raised concerning Olivi&apos;s position. First, philosophically, there are concerns over how Olivi could take such a seemingly extreme view: surely the relevant objects must play some causal role in explaining why, e.g., I am cognizing this object in front of me and not any other. Second, historically, it can be rather difficult to trace Olivi&apos;s influence, especially positively, given how extreme his view is oft presented (sometimes even by himself) and general controversies surrounding his name as well. As I will argue, by examining Olivi alongside another, rather understudied figure, Gonsalvus of Spain (~1255-1313), both of the above issues can be alleviated. Gonsalvus was a student of Olivi, eventually to become General Minister of their Franciscan order, who was even &quot;charged&quot; by a critical party in his day of following certain views of Olivi. As I take it, Gonsalvus indeed follows Olivi on this topic at hand, though he takes a more diplomatic approach. In short, in this paper, I argue that both Olivi and Gonsalvus still allow for a broadly efficient causal role for the objects of cognition and volition, albeit as secondary or &quot;sine qua non&quot; causes, and in this way it is consistent that the cognitive and appetitive powers are still the primary efficient causes of their respective acts. Gonsalvus, interestingly, takes a more conciliatory tone than Olivi, but I take this to show that Olivi could have made his view appear less radical if that were his interest (it just wasn&apos;t).

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

De intellectu. Greek, Arabic, Latin, and Hebrew Texts and Their Influence on Medieval Philosophy.

ISBN

978-84-9927-776-9

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

186-206

Počet stran knihy

574

Název nakladatele

UCOPress. Córdoba University Press

Místo vydání

Córdoba

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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