The person at law from the point of view of pure legal science
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11220%2F13%3A10120769" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11220/13:10120769 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="http://www.ilaw.cas.cz/tlq/index.php/tlq/article/view/59/49" target="_blank" >http://www.ilaw.cas.cz/tlq/index.php/tlq/article/view/59/49</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
The person at law from the point of view of pure legal science
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The person as a legal term is traditionally derived from a human being, either from an individual or a group of people. Hans Kelsen maintains that no such substance really exists. "The person exists only insofar as he "has" duties and rights; apart fromthem the person has no existence whatsoever." This is why a human being is construed as an abstract holder of subjective rights rather than the person in a legal sense. This conception results in the normative construction of a person. The person is considered to be a mere point, an ideal and never real fact. Kelsen designates this point as "personification of the set of norms" regulating the conduct of a human being. However, such an entity as the personification of legal norms does not exist in the outer, real world. The legal order may attach legal personality to any segment of the outer world, even to an imagination of something non-existent in the outer world. The relationship between this abstract point and the addressee of duties
Název v anglickém jazyce
The person at law from the point of view of pure legal science
Popis výsledku anglicky
The person as a legal term is traditionally derived from a human being, either from an individual or a group of people. Hans Kelsen maintains that no such substance really exists. "The person exists only insofar as he "has" duties and rights; apart fromthem the person has no existence whatsoever." This is why a human being is construed as an abstract holder of subjective rights rather than the person in a legal sense. This conception results in the normative construction of a person. The person is considered to be a mere point, an ideal and never real fact. Kelsen designates this point as "personification of the set of norms" regulating the conduct of a human being. However, such an entity as the personification of legal norms does not exist in the outer, real world. The legal order may attach legal personality to any segment of the outer world, even to an imagination of something non-existent in the outer world. The relationship between this abstract point and the addressee of duties
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>x</sub> - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)
CEP obor
AG - Právní vědy
OECD FORD obor
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Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
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Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2013
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
The Lawyer quarterly
ISSN
1805-840X
e-ISSN
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Svazek periodika
2013
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
1
Stát vydavatele periodika
CZ - Česká republika
Počet stran výsledku
14
Strana od-do
29-42
Kód UT WoS článku
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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
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