Analysis of the Cartel Legislation and Leniency Programs in Germany and the Czech Republic
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11220%2F13%3A10192750" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11220/13:10192750 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Analysis of the Cartel Legislation and Leniency Programs in Germany and the Czech Republic
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Judging the influence of private law enforcement on the success of the leniency programs is a very interesting and current topic. When dealing with it, it is necessary to find an answer to following question: How should be handled the initiative of the European Commission to strengthen the private law pillar of the cartel law enforcement not to weaken the public law pillar at the same time? It is possible to assume that the support of private enforcement of damages discourages cartel participants to report the existence of a cartel and avoid the fine imposed by the state, because by admitting a cartel they potentially face an even larger financial burden than in the case of a fine. However, the other point of view is, taking into account the very low effort of the impaired parties (mainly consumers) to enforce their claims through private means, that the support of private enforcement should not be perceived as a danger to the functionality of leniency programs, but only as their suita
Název v anglickém jazyce
Analysis of the Cartel Legislation and Leniency Programs in Germany and the Czech Republic
Popis výsledku anglicky
Judging the influence of private law enforcement on the success of the leniency programs is a very interesting and current topic. When dealing with it, it is necessary to find an answer to following question: How should be handled the initiative of the European Commission to strengthen the private law pillar of the cartel law enforcement not to weaken the public law pillar at the same time? It is possible to assume that the support of private enforcement of damages discourages cartel participants to report the existence of a cartel and avoid the fine imposed by the state, because by admitting a cartel they potentially face an even larger financial burden than in the case of a fine. However, the other point of view is, taking into account the very low effort of the impaired parties (mainly consumers) to enforce their claims through private means, that the support of private enforcement should not be perceived as a danger to the functionality of leniency programs, but only as their suita
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>x</sub> - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)
CEP obor
AG - Právní vědy
OECD FORD obor
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Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
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Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2013
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
The Lawyer Quarterly, International Joumal for Legal Research
ISSN
1805-840X
e-ISSN
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Svazek periodika
3
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
3
Stát vydavatele periodika
CZ - Česká republika
Počet stran výsledku
17
Strana od-do
235-251
Kód UT WoS článku
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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
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