Independent Regulatory Agency: Delegation of Powers : Charles University in Prague Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2019/III/3

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11220%2F19%3A10399288" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11220/19:10399288 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=qBUTsdgJnj" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=qBUTsdgJnj</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Independent Regulatory Agency: Delegation of Powers : Charles University in Prague Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2019/III/3

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The existence of independent regulatory agencies - independent bodies which operate at arm&apos;s length from the government and which are not directly accountable to the voters or their elected representatives - is still the object of intense debate. Independent regulatory agencies emerge in democratic policies across the world. It is difficult to find de lege ferenda rationale for their existence in a democracy where public policy is supposed to be made by electorally accountable people and where public institutions are not usually endowed with a high degree of independence. Thanks to economic theories and principles this article reveals a justification of their existence and gives arguments for their creation. The instrumental rationality problem, the problem of time inconsistency and the credible commitment problem constitute a heavy burden for government in some areas. A delegation of regulatory powers in these areas from the government to an independent body represents a solution to all these problems. The knowledge gained from economic theories can be beneficial for comprehension of the functioning of independent authorities and for setting their institutional legal framework.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Independent Regulatory Agency: Delegation of Powers : Charles University in Prague Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2019/III/3

Popis výsledku anglicky

The existence of independent regulatory agencies - independent bodies which operate at arm&apos;s length from the government and which are not directly accountable to the voters or their elected representatives - is still the object of intense debate. Independent regulatory agencies emerge in democratic policies across the world. It is difficult to find de lege ferenda rationale for their existence in a democracy where public policy is supposed to be made by electorally accountable people and where public institutions are not usually endowed with a high degree of independence. Thanks to economic theories and principles this article reveals a justification of their existence and gives arguments for their creation. The instrumental rationality problem, the problem of time inconsistency and the credible commitment problem constitute a heavy burden for government in some areas. A delegation of regulatory powers in these areas from the government to an independent body represents a solution to all these problems. The knowledge gained from economic theories can be beneficial for comprehension of the functioning of independent authorities and for setting their institutional legal framework.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Prague Law Working Paper Series [online]

ISSN

2336-5811

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

2019

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

3

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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