Signaling by Underpricing the Initial Public Offerings of Primary Listings in an Emerging Market

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F15%3A10297832" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/15:10297832 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/1336" target="_blank" >http://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/1336</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Signaling by Underpricing the Initial Public Offerings of Primary Listings in an Emerging Market

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We show that issuers use initial public offering (IPO) underpricing to signal their quality when the a priori information asymmetry is significant. Contrary to weak evidence in the signaling hypothesis from established markets, we find that in a less transparent emerging market firms strategically underprice their IPOs to issue seasoned equity at better terms. Private firms that underpriced their primary listing in Poland between 2005 and 2009 were more likely to make follow-up seasoned equity offerings(SEOs) and their SEOs were larger and occurred sooner after the IPOs. This suggests that the economic incentives to follow the signaling strategy are stronger in opaque environments where high-quality issuers may underprice IPOs to overcome informationasymmetry.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Signaling by Underpricing the Initial Public Offerings of Primary Listings in an Emerging Market

Popis výsledku anglicky

We show that issuers use initial public offering (IPO) underpricing to signal their quality when the a priori information asymmetry is significant. Contrary to weak evidence in the signaling hypothesis from established markets, we find that in a less transparent emerging market firms strategically underprice their IPOs to issue seasoned equity at better terms. Private firms that underpriced their primary listing in Poland between 2005 and 2009 were more likely to make follow-up seasoned equity offerings(SEOs) and their SEOs were larger and occurred sooner after the IPOs. This suggests that the economic incentives to follow the signaling strategy are stronger in opaque environments where high-quality issuers may underprice IPOs to overcome informationasymmetry.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

Výsledek vznikl pri realizaci vícero projektů. Více informací v záložce Projekty.

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Finance a úvěr

ISSN

0015-1920

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

65

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

29

Strana od-do

307-335

Kód UT WoS článku

000361154600003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84940521130