Communication and Credibility in Multilateral Negotiations

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F16%3A10324253" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/16:10324253 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=342510" target="_blank" >https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=342510</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/PC2016-1-44" target="_blank" >10.5817/PC2016-1-44</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Communication and Credibility in Multilateral Negotiations

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Multilateral negotiations form the basis of much international cooperation, but the hurdle of reaching agreement often proves insurmountable. One prominent example of such negotiations is the Doha round of trade liberalization talks in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The round has already lasted more than fourteen years but, so far, has fallen short of its original ambition. This article identifies one possible reason why multilateral negotiations such as those of the Doha round face difficulties, namely the dysfunctional communication among states. I contend that a state's ability to effectively articulate its interests is inhibited when its interests are dispersed across a number of issues under negotiation rather than focused on one or two primary areas. For straightforward domestic political reasons, a state that pursues multiple interests in negotiations will have difficulty in credibly communicating its position to other participants. This decreases the efficiency of negotiations, creates delays, and may lead to negotiation deadlock. I test this proposition with the use of a newly collected dataset of coded public statements by representatives of WTO member states at the eight ministerial conferences between 1996 and 2011.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Communication and Credibility in Multilateral Negotiations

Popis výsledku anglicky

Multilateral negotiations form the basis of much international cooperation, but the hurdle of reaching agreement often proves insurmountable. One prominent example of such negotiations is the Doha round of trade liberalization talks in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The round has already lasted more than fourteen years but, so far, has fallen short of its original ambition. This article identifies one possible reason why multilateral negotiations such as those of the Doha round face difficulties, namely the dysfunctional communication among states. I contend that a state's ability to effectively articulate its interests is inhibited when its interests are dispersed across a number of issues under negotiation rather than focused on one or two primary areas. For straightforward domestic political reasons, a state that pursues multiple interests in negotiations will have difficulty in credibly communicating its position to other participants. This decreases the efficiency of negotiations, creates delays, and may lead to negotiation deadlock. I test this proposition with the use of a newly collected dataset of coded public statements by representatives of WTO member states at the eight ministerial conferences between 1996 and 2011.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AD - Politologie a politické vědy

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA15-12533S" target="_blank" >GA15-12533S: Členské státy ve WTO: preference, dodržování závazků a monitorování</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Politologický časopis

ISSN

1211-3247

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

2016

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

44-64

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84963799199