The impact of using an external authority on the quality of public procurement
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F16%3A10324838" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/16:10324838 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
The impact of using an external authority on the quality of public procurement
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The article deals with the empirical verification part of the hypothesis of "bureaucratic safety" applied to the example of public procurement in the years 2010- 2014. We presume that the contracting authorities are trying to minimize the risk of conflict and therefore are entrusting the administration of contracts to external authorities, or perhaps it is their view that these external authorities would administer them in a higher quality fashion. For the purposes of this article, we consider quality to be represented as the odds ratio that the Office for Protection of Competition will conclude that a public contract was managed improperly. The aim of this article is to compare in-house and external administration of public contracts in terms of the probability of an appeal, the initiation of an investigation, and the finding of any violations by the Office for Protection of Competition. For the purposes of our analysis, we used data on 69,959 public contracts, which we paired with 1965 first instance decisions of the Office for the Protection of Competition. We then applied logistic regression to this data. The achieved results are very surprising because we were unable to demonstrate a statistically significant difference between in-house and external administration, which should affect the decisions of the Office for the Protection of Competition. The results are very challenging for public policy since the current size of the procurement market is around 577 billion CZK. Additionally, the amount of transaction costs associated with procurement is very important. Each partial streamlining of public procurement can bring significant savings of public funds.
Název v anglickém jazyce
The impact of using an external authority on the quality of public procurement
Popis výsledku anglicky
The article deals with the empirical verification part of the hypothesis of "bureaucratic safety" applied to the example of public procurement in the years 2010- 2014. We presume that the contracting authorities are trying to minimize the risk of conflict and therefore are entrusting the administration of contracts to external authorities, or perhaps it is their view that these external authorities would administer them in a higher quality fashion. For the purposes of this article, we consider quality to be represented as the odds ratio that the Office for Protection of Competition will conclude that a public contract was managed improperly. The aim of this article is to compare in-house and external administration of public contracts in terms of the probability of an appeal, the initiation of an investigation, and the finding of any violations by the Office for Protection of Competition. For the purposes of our analysis, we used data on 69,959 public contracts, which we paired with 1965 first instance decisions of the Office for the Protection of Competition. We then applied logistic regression to this data. The achieved results are very surprising because we were unable to demonstrate a statistically significant difference between in-house and external administration, which should affect the decisions of the Office for the Protection of Competition. The results are very challenging for public policy since the current size of the procurement market is around 577 billion CZK. Additionally, the amount of transaction costs associated with procurement is very important. Each partial streamlining of public procurement can bring significant savings of public funds.
Klasifikace
Druh
D - Stať ve sborníku
CEP obor
AE - Řízení, správa a administrativa
OECD FORD obor
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Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
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Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2016
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název statě ve sborníku
European Financial Systems 2016: Proceedings of the 13th International Scientific Cconference
ISBN
978-80-210-8308-0
ISSN
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e-ISSN
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Počet stran výsledku
7
Strana od-do
602-608
Název nakladatele
Masaryk University
Místo vydání
Brno
Místo konání akce
Brno
Datum konání akce
27. 6. 2016
Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti
EUR - Evropská akce
Kód UT WoS článku
000385692200080