Control, soft information, and the politics of international organizations staffing

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F17%3A10323533" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/17:10323533 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11558-016-9252-1" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11558-016-9252-1</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11558-016-9252-1" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11558-016-9252-1</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Control, soft information, and the politics of international organizations staffing

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article offers insights into the aggregate patterns of the geographical distribution of professional staff in some of the major international organizations (IOs). Building on the principal-agent framework, I argue that powerful member states seek dominant positions in IOs&apos; secretariats, in an effort to increase their ability to control them. At the same time, it is often the weakest low-income countries that are the IOs&apos; primary clients. Over-representation of the most powerful states is likely to lead to functional and legitimation problems for the IOs, in particular with regard to the IOs&apos; lack of access to &apos;soft&apos; information about the countries in which they operate. Using a newly created dataset covering 19 major bodies of the United Nations family, I identify two aggregate patterns in the geographical distribution of their professional staff. First, the most powerful states dominate IOs&apos; secretariats. Second, however, many IOs systematically deviate in their staffing practices from this overall pattern, as well as from the existing rules that formalize it, and relatively over-represent also low-income countries. What results is a curvilinear (U-shaped) pattern where both powerful and very poor states are over-represented in many IOs&apos; professional staff.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Control, soft information, and the politics of international organizations staffing

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article offers insights into the aggregate patterns of the geographical distribution of professional staff in some of the major international organizations (IOs). Building on the principal-agent framework, I argue that powerful member states seek dominant positions in IOs&apos; secretariats, in an effort to increase their ability to control them. At the same time, it is often the weakest low-income countries that are the IOs&apos; primary clients. Over-representation of the most powerful states is likely to lead to functional and legitimation problems for the IOs, in particular with regard to the IOs&apos; lack of access to &apos;soft&apos; information about the countries in which they operate. Using a newly created dataset covering 19 major bodies of the United Nations family, I identify two aggregate patterns in the geographical distribution of their professional staff. First, the most powerful states dominate IOs&apos; secretariats. Second, however, many IOs systematically deviate in their staffing practices from this overall pattern, as well as from the existing rules that formalize it, and relatively over-represent also low-income countries. What results is a curvilinear (U-shaped) pattern where both powerful and very poor states are over-represented in many IOs&apos; professional staff.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA15-12533S" target="_blank" >GA15-12533S: Členské státy ve WTO: preference, dodržování závazků a monitorování</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Review of International Organizations

ISSN

1559-7431

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

12

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

25

Strana od-do

559-583

Kód UT WoS článku

000413738600003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84964557308