Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F18%3A10373113" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/18:10373113 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/61384399:31150/18:00051877

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00128775.2017.1394161" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1080/00128775.2017.1394161</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00128775.2017.1394161" target="_blank" >10.1080/00128775.2017.1394161</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article experimentally examines two complex multi-unit auction mechanismsa simultaneous multi-round auction and its extension with combinatorial biddingthat offer the opportunity to communicate and thus collude. The general setting and parametrization originated in the 2013 Czech Spectrum Auction. The results suggest that the package bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Strikingly, allowing for communication increases efficiency in the examined auction formats. A cheap-talk collusive agreement resulted in better allocation, as compared to the treatments without communication. The authors hypothesize that combinatorial bidding makes the decision-making of bidders too complicated and causes inefficiency, especially in auctions with large numbers of goods.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article experimentally examines two complex multi-unit auction mechanismsa simultaneous multi-round auction and its extension with combinatorial biddingthat offer the opportunity to communicate and thus collude. The general setting and parametrization originated in the 2013 Czech Spectrum Auction. The results suggest that the package bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Strikingly, allowing for communication increases efficiency in the examined auction formats. A cheap-talk collusive agreement resulted in better allocation, as compared to the treatments without communication. The authors hypothesize that combinatorial bidding makes the decision-making of bidders too complicated and causes inefficiency, especially in auctions with large numbers of goods.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Eastern European Economics

ISSN

0012-8775

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

56

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

29

Strana od-do

28-56

Kód UT WoS článku

000425690800002

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85033700853