State Responsibility in the Cyber Age : The Course towards Indirect Evidence

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F18%3A10386238" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/18:10386238 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.32422/mv.1585" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.32422/mv.1585</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.32422/mv.1585" target="_blank" >10.32422/mv.1585</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

State Responsibility in the Cyber Age : The Course towards Indirect Evidence

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The problem of attributing responsibility for cyber-attacks is almost as old as cyberspace itself, yet it remains one of the most troublesome issues of that domain. It is often impossible to uncover direct evidence that would reveal the identities of the attackers. Investigators must therefore rely on other, more indirect avenues of proof. The aim of this exploratory study is to develop a basic categorisation of indirect evidence that can be used to attribute state responsibility for cyber-attacks in international relations. To do so, the article works with international legal concepts but transposes them into the analysis of international relations. The categorization of indirect proof is based on the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008, which provides one of the richest arrays of this kind of evidence. The analysis identifies four kinds of indirect evidence: level of coordination, level of preparedness, state relations with the national hacker community, and state conception of cyber-security.

Název v anglickém jazyce

State Responsibility in the Cyber Age : The Course towards Indirect Evidence

Popis výsledku anglicky

The problem of attributing responsibility for cyber-attacks is almost as old as cyberspace itself, yet it remains one of the most troublesome issues of that domain. It is often impossible to uncover direct evidence that would reveal the identities of the attackers. Investigators must therefore rely on other, more indirect avenues of proof. The aim of this exploratory study is to develop a basic categorisation of indirect evidence that can be used to attribute state responsibility for cyber-attacks in international relations. To do so, the article works with international legal concepts but transposes them into the analysis of international relations. The categorization of indirect proof is based on the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008, which provides one of the richest arrays of this kind of evidence. The analysis identifies four kinds of indirect evidence: level of coordination, level of preparedness, state relations with the national hacker community, and state conception of cyber-security.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Mezinárodní vztahy

ISSN

0323-1844

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

53

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

35-46

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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