Closing the Window of Vulnerability: Nuclear Proliferation and Conventional Retaliation

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F19%3A10380367" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/19:10380367 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=711BBSqIjJ" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=711BBSqIjJ</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1508635" target="_blank" >10.1080/09636412.2018.1508635</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Closing the Window of Vulnerability: Nuclear Proliferation and Conventional Retaliation

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Living with a nuclear-armed enemy is unattractive, but, strangely, states seldom use their military power to prevent the enemy&apos;s entry into the nuclear club. It is puzzling why preventive strikes against nuclear programs have been quite rare. I address this puzzle by considering the role of conventional retaliation, a subfield of deterrence that so far has received scant attention in the literature. I theorize the concept of conventional retaliation and test its explanatory power. First, I explore all historical cases where states struck another state&apos;s nuclear installations and find none occurring when the proliferator threatened conventional retaliation. Second, I explore two cases where a strike was most likely, but the would-be attacker balked and find smoking-gun evidence that the threat of conventional retaliation restrained the would-be attacker. This evidence supports my claim that the threat of conventional retaliation is sufficient to deter a preventive strike against emerging nuclear states.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Closing the Window of Vulnerability: Nuclear Proliferation and Conventional Retaliation

Popis výsledku anglicky

Living with a nuclear-armed enemy is unattractive, but, strangely, states seldom use their military power to prevent the enemy&apos;s entry into the nuclear club. It is puzzling why preventive strikes against nuclear programs have been quite rare. I address this puzzle by considering the role of conventional retaliation, a subfield of deterrence that so far has received scant attention in the literature. I theorize the concept of conventional retaliation and test its explanatory power. First, I explore all historical cases where states struck another state&apos;s nuclear installations and find none occurring when the proliferator threatened conventional retaliation. Second, I explore two cases where a strike was most likely, but the would-be attacker balked and find smoking-gun evidence that the threat of conventional retaliation restrained the would-be attacker. This evidence supports my claim that the threat of conventional retaliation is sufficient to deter a preventive strike against emerging nuclear states.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA16-02288S" target="_blank" >GA16-02288S: Anatomie revizionismu a jeho vliv na (sub-)regionální institucionalizace a aliance</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Security Studies

ISSN

0963-6412

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

28

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

29

Strana od-do

87-115

Kód UT WoS článku

000460312400004

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85054792120