Rebel Group Protection Rackets: Simulating the Effects of Economic Support on Civil War Violence

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F20%3A10416961" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/20:10416961 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29333-8_11" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29333-8_11</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29333-8_11" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-29333-8_11</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Rebel Group Protection Rackets: Simulating the Effects of Economic Support on Civil War Violence

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Rebel groups engage in a series of economic transactions with their local populations during a civil war. These interactions resemble those of a protection racket, in which aspiring governing groups extort the local economic actors to fund their fighting activities and control the territory. Seeking security in this unstable political environment, these economic actors may decide to flee or to pay the rebels in order to ensure their own protection, impacting the outcomes of the civil war. We present a simulation model (executable at https://gnardin.github.io/RebelGroups) that attempts to capture the decision-making and behavior of the involved actors during protection racket interactions as well as the cooperation and competition between rebel groups to control territory. Our model reveals insights about the mechanisms that are helpful for understanding violence outcomes in civil wars, and the conditions that may lead rebel groups to prevail. Analysis of various scenarios demonstrates the impact that different security factors play on civil war dynamics. Using Somalia as a case study, we also assess the importance of the rebel groups&apos; economic bases of support in a real-world setting.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Rebel Group Protection Rackets: Simulating the Effects of Economic Support on Civil War Violence

Popis výsledku anglicky

Rebel groups engage in a series of economic transactions with their local populations during a civil war. These interactions resemble those of a protection racket, in which aspiring governing groups extort the local economic actors to fund their fighting activities and control the territory. Seeking security in this unstable political environment, these economic actors may decide to flee or to pay the rebels in order to ensure their own protection, impacting the outcomes of the civil war. We present a simulation model (executable at https://gnardin.github.io/RebelGroups) that attempts to capture the decision-making and behavior of the involved actors during protection racket interactions as well as the cooperation and competition between rebel groups to control territory. Our model reveals insights about the mechanisms that are helpful for understanding violence outcomes in civil wars, and the conditions that may lead rebel groups to prevail. Analysis of various scenarios demonstrates the impact that different security factors play on civil war dynamics. Using Somalia as a case study, we also assess the importance of the rebel groups&apos; economic bases of support in a real-world setting.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Computational Conflict Research

ISBN

978-3-030-29332-1

Počet stran výsledku

27

Strana od-do

225-251

Počet stran knihy

264

Název nakladatele

Springer

Místo vydání

Cham

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

—