State commitments and inhumane conventional weapons: An explanatory analysis of treaty ratification
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F23%3A10454494" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/23:10454494 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=6oZizyZJ4T" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=6oZizyZJ4T</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00108367221113459" target="_blank" >10.1177/00108367221113459</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
State commitments and inhumane conventional weapons: An explanatory analysis of treaty ratification
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
In the last 40 years, the international community has made considerable progress towards the regulation of inhumane conventional weapons (ICWs) by adopting treaties that regulate or ban these weapons. However, many states have still not joined these treaties or have joined them with a considerable delay. These ratification decisions cannot be satisfactorily explained by the existing literature on the origin of ICW treaties, which stress the role of global socialization processes. This article offers a theoretical argument that explains state decisions on the ratification of ICW treaties. It argues that while democracies and countries located in regions with high ratification rates are prone to ratify ICW treaties, an insecure external environment impedes or delays ratification. The argument also claims that security costs resulting from the characteristics of the individual treaties can modify the effects of these explanatory factors. To provide an empirical test for the argument, the article conducts a survival analysis that covers the ratification processes of the three existing ICW treaties.
Název v anglickém jazyce
State commitments and inhumane conventional weapons: An explanatory analysis of treaty ratification
Popis výsledku anglicky
In the last 40 years, the international community has made considerable progress towards the regulation of inhumane conventional weapons (ICWs) by adopting treaties that regulate or ban these weapons. However, many states have still not joined these treaties or have joined them with a considerable delay. These ratification decisions cannot be satisfactorily explained by the existing literature on the origin of ICW treaties, which stress the role of global socialization processes. This article offers a theoretical argument that explains state decisions on the ratification of ICW treaties. It argues that while democracies and countries located in regions with high ratification rates are prone to ratify ICW treaties, an insecure external environment impedes or delays ratification. The argument also claims that security costs resulting from the characteristics of the individual treaties can modify the effects of these explanatory factors. To provide an empirical test for the argument, the article conducts a survival analysis that covers the ratification processes of the three existing ICW treaties.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
50601 - Political science
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/GA21-08124S" target="_blank" >GA21-08124S: Ratifikace všeobecných smluv o kontrole zbrojení: vysvětlující faktory</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2023
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Cooperation and Conflict
ISSN
0010-8367
e-ISSN
1460-3691
Svazek periodika
58
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
3
Stát vydavatele periodika
NO - Norské království
Počet stran výsledku
21
Strana od-do
335-355
Kód UT WoS článku
000834559200001
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85135269221