Annexation Attempts as a Two-Level Game: Israel and the West Bank in 1967 and 2020
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F24%3A10480364" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/24:10480364 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=xvDn4ln7gW" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=xvDn4ln7gW</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogae013" target="_blank" >10.1093/jogss/ogae013</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Annexation Attempts as a Two-Level Game: Israel and the West Bank in 1967 and 2020
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Annexation attempts threaten international security and the rules-based world order. Yet, studies of annexation are rare, whilst the scant relevant literature is great-power centric. This article therefore asks why some non-great power annexations succeed, whereas others do not. Applying Putnam's two-level game framework, it analyses an occupier's: (1) domestic politics; (2) international relations; and (3) interactions between these two levels of analysis. It applies this framework to Israeli policy in two specific cases: partial annexation, where Israel annexed East Jerusalem but not the entire West Bank (1967); and Israel's comprehensive but aborted West Bank annexation (2020). This article finds that when the policy would yield maximum domestic returns and minimal global opprobrium, Israel's leaders enacted annexation. They refrained from doing so when this synchronization was absent. These findings illustrate the utility of the two-level game framework for explaining non-great powers' decision-making and their territorial policies in particular.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Annexation Attempts as a Two-Level Game: Israel and the West Bank in 1967 and 2020
Popis výsledku anglicky
Annexation attempts threaten international security and the rules-based world order. Yet, studies of annexation are rare, whilst the scant relevant literature is great-power centric. This article therefore asks why some non-great power annexations succeed, whereas others do not. Applying Putnam's two-level game framework, it analyses an occupier's: (1) domestic politics; (2) international relations; and (3) interactions between these two levels of analysis. It applies this framework to Israeli policy in two specific cases: partial annexation, where Israel annexed East Jerusalem but not the entire West Bank (1967); and Israel's comprehensive but aborted West Bank annexation (2020). This article finds that when the policy would yield maximum domestic returns and minimal global opprobrium, Israel's leaders enacted annexation. They refrained from doing so when this synchronization was absent. These findings illustrate the utility of the two-level game framework for explaining non-great powers' decision-making and their territorial policies in particular.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
50601 - Political science
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
—
Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2024
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
The Journal of Global Security Studies
ISSN
2057-3170
e-ISSN
2057-3189
Svazek periodika
9
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
2
Stát vydavatele periodika
US - Spojené státy americké
Počet stran výsledku
20
Strana od-do
1-20
Kód UT WoS článku
001222895600001
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85193568788