Tradable planning permits versus auctioned tradable development rights: different trading agents, different policy outcomes

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11240%2F16%3A10325102" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11240/16:10325102 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2015.1077105" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2015.1077105</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2015.1077105" target="_blank" >10.1080/09640568.2015.1077105</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Tradable planning permits versus auctioned tradable development rights: different trading agents, different policy outcomes

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The tradable planning permit (TPP) policy seeks to limit the land take by development. It can be used in countries where development rights are vested by land-use planning to certain landowners only. TPPs are traded among public authorities. We introduce here a new policy, called the auctioned tradable development rights (ATDR) policy, which takes advantage of unvested rights of development and of trading among private actors. We compare the TPP, the ATDR policy and our baseline land-use planning model using a set of criteria. There are trade-offs within compared models. Both trading policies extend opportunities for land protection from development in exchange for higher transaction costs (highest in the ATDR policy). Trading policies seek also to recapture a part of development rent, decrease rent-seeking, and locate new development more effectively from the investors' perspective. However, trading among public authorities in the TPP model may hinder attaining these effects.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Tradable planning permits versus auctioned tradable development rights: different trading agents, different policy outcomes

Popis výsledku anglicky

The tradable planning permit (TPP) policy seeks to limit the land take by development. It can be used in countries where development rights are vested by land-use planning to certain landowners only. TPPs are traded among public authorities. We introduce here a new policy, called the auctioned tradable development rights (ATDR) policy, which takes advantage of unvested rights of development and of trading among private actors. We compare the TPP, the ATDR policy and our baseline land-use planning model using a set of criteria. There are trade-offs within compared models. Both trading policies extend opportunities for land protection from development in exchange for higher transaction costs (highest in the ATDR policy). Trading policies seek also to recapture a part of development rent, decrease rent-seeking, and locate new development more effectively from the investors' perspective. However, trading among public authorities in the TPP model may hinder attaining these effects.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

DO - Ochrana krajinných území

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Environmental Planning and Management

ISSN

0964-0568

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

59

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

8

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

1418-1437

Kód UT WoS článku

000377275700005

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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