Old and new solutions for bargaining problems
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11320%2F13%3A10189388" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11320/13:10189388 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Old and new solutions for bargaining problems
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
We are concerned with modeling situations in which rational individuals can conclude profitable agreements but they may disagree about which agreement to conclude. Since Nash's papers on bargaining and Raiffa's studies on arbitration in the beginning of1950's, it has been customary to formulate this problem as a nonempty collection B of pairs (S, d) where each S from B is a nonempty subset of a finite-dimensional real linear space IRn and d is a point in S. The elements of S are usually interpreted asthe utility tuples that the players can obtain by cooperating, and d as the outcome when the players do not cooperate. We deal with point-valued solutions; that is, we wish to find a mapping from B into IRn which satisfies some plausible conditions like;for example, individual rationality, Pareto optimality, anonymity. First we present major models (some old, some recent) and their solution concepts. Then we propose some directions for future research. In particular, we discuss some of
Název v anglickém jazyce
Old and new solutions for bargaining problems
Popis výsledku anglicky
We are concerned with modeling situations in which rational individuals can conclude profitable agreements but they may disagree about which agreement to conclude. Since Nash's papers on bargaining and Raiffa's studies on arbitration in the beginning of1950's, it has been customary to formulate this problem as a nonempty collection B of pairs (S, d) where each S from B is a nonempty subset of a finite-dimensional real linear space IRn and d is a point in S. The elements of S are usually interpreted asthe utility tuples that the players can obtain by cooperating, and d as the outcome when the players do not cooperate. We deal with point-valued solutions; that is, we wish to find a mapping from B into IRn which satisfies some plausible conditions like;for example, individual rationality, Pareto optimality, anonymity. First we present major models (some old, some recent) and their solution concepts. Then we propose some directions for future research. In particular, we discuss some of
Klasifikace
Druh
D - Stať ve sborníku
CEP obor
BB - Aplikovaná statistika, operační výzkum
OECD FORD obor
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Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
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Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2013
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název statě ve sborníku
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Strategic Management and its Support by Information Systems
ISBN
978-80-248-3096-4
ISSN
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e-ISSN
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Počet stran výsledku
8
Strana od-do
228-235
Název nakladatele
VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava
Místo vydání
Ostrava
Místo konání akce
Valašské Meziříčí
Datum konání akce
29. 8. 2013
Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti
EUR - Evropská akce
Kód UT WoS článku
000324842000022