Rule Enforcing Through Ordering

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11320%2F23%3A10477620" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11320/23:10477620 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50670-3_3" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50670-3_3</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50670-3_3" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-031-50670-3_3</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Rule Enforcing Through Ordering

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In many real world situations, like minor traffic offenses in big cities, a central authority is tasked with periodic administering punishments to a large number of individuals. Common practice is to give each individual a chance to suffer a smaller fine and be guaranteed to avoid the legal process with probable considerably larger punishment. However, thanks to the large number of offenders and a limited capacity of the central authority, the individual risk is typically small and a rational individual will not choose to pay the fine. Here we show that if the central authority processes the offenders in a publicly known order, it properly incentives the offenders to pay the fine. We show analytically and on realistic experiments that our mechanism promotes non-cooperation and incentives individuals to pay. Moreover, the same holds for an arbitrary coalition. We quantify the expected total payment the central authority receives, and show it increases considerably.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Rule Enforcing Through Ordering

Popis výsledku anglicky

In many real world situations, like minor traffic offenses in big cities, a central authority is tasked with periodic administering punishments to a large number of individuals. Common practice is to give each individual a chance to suffer a smaller fine and be guaranteed to avoid the legal process with probable considerably larger punishment. However, thanks to the large number of offenders and a limited capacity of the central authority, the individual risk is typically small and a rational individual will not choose to pay the fine. Here we show that if the central authority processes the offenders in a publicly known order, it properly incentives the offenders to pay the fine. We show analytically and on realistic experiments that our mechanism promotes non-cooperation and incentives individuals to pay. Moreover, the same holds for an arbitrary coalition. We quantify the expected total payment the central authority receives, and show it increases considerably.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Decision and Game Theory for Security: 14th International Conference, GameSec 2023, Avignon, France, October 18–20, 2023, Proceedings

ISBN

978-3-031-50669-7

ISSN

—

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

43-62

Název nakladatele

Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg

Místo vydání

Heidelberg

Místo konání akce

Avignon, France

Datum konání akce

18. 10. 2023

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

—