Oligopolistic price competition with informed and uninformed buyers

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F10%3A00351492" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/10:00351492 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Oligopolistic price competition with informed and uninformed buyers

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The standard price competition of two or more players leads to Bertrand equilibrium in basic economic theory. I follow the literature that originated with Varian?s (1980) model, especially Kocas and Kiyak (2006), and analyze oligopolistic markets where buyers have reservation values drawn from a common distribution function rather than a single value (inelastic demand), as typically assumed in the models of Varian?s or Kocas and Kiyak?s type. The model presented in this paper is developed from the simplest symmetric set-up (uninformed buyers are assigned to sellers evenly) to the most complex asymmetric set-up with many competing sellers (uninformed buyers are distributed over sellers unevenly).

Název v anglickém jazyce

Oligopolistic price competition with informed and uninformed buyers

Popis výsledku anglicky

The standard price competition of two or more players leads to Bertrand equilibrium in basic economic theory. I follow the literature that originated with Varian?s (1980) model, especially Kocas and Kiyak (2006), and analyze oligopolistic markets where buyers have reservation values drawn from a common distribution function rather than a single value (inelastic demand), as typically assumed in the models of Varian?s or Kocas and Kiyak?s type. The model presented in this paper is developed from the simplest symmetric set-up (uninformed buyers are assigned to sellers evenly) to the most complex asymmetric set-up with many competing sellers (uninformed buyers are distributed over sellers unevenly).

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2010

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

CERGE-EI Working Paper Series

ISSN

1211-3298

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

-

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

413

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

34

Strana od-do

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Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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