On the effects of deposit insurance and observability on bank runs: an experimental study

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F12%3A00388372" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/12:00388372 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00548.x" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00548.x</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00548.x" target="_blank" >10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00548.x</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

On the effects of deposit insurance and observability on bank runs: an experimental study

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We study the effects of deposit insurance and observability of previous actions on the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We consider three depositors in the line of a bank, who decide between withdrawing or keeping their money deposited. We have three treatments with different levels of deposit insurance which reflect the losses a depositor may incur in the case of a bank run.We find that different levels of deposit insurance and the possibility of observing other depositors? actions affect the likelihood of bank runs. When decisions are not observable, higher levels of deposit insurance decrease the probability of bank runs. When decisions are observable, this need not to be the case. These results suggest that (i)observability might be considered as a partial substitute of deposit insurance and (ii) the optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of observability.

Název v anglickém jazyce

On the effects of deposit insurance and observability on bank runs: an experimental study

Popis výsledku anglicky

We study the effects of deposit insurance and observability of previous actions on the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We consider three depositors in the line of a bank, who decide between withdrawing or keeping their money deposited. We have three treatments with different levels of deposit insurance which reflect the losses a depositor may incur in the case of a bank run.We find that different levels of deposit insurance and the possibility of observing other depositors? actions affect the likelihood of bank runs. When decisions are not observable, higher levels of deposit insurance decrease the probability of bank runs. When decisions are observable, this need not to be the case. These results suggest that (i)observability might be considered as a partial substitute of deposit insurance and (ii) the optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of observability.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Money Credit and Banking

ISSN

0022-2879

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

44

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

8

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

1651-1665

Kód UT WoS článku

000311614900008

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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