Nonlinear incentive schemes and corruption in public procurement: evidence from the Czech Republic

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F13%3A00383151" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/13:00383151 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp483.pdf" target="_blank" >http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp483.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Nonlinear incentive schemes and corruption in public procurement: evidence from the Czech Republic

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article uses data on Czech public procurement contracts from 2005 - 2010 in order to uncover patterns suggestive of corrupt behavior of procuring officials. Using polynomial regressions and local linear density estimators, the article provides evidence that procurement officials manipulate anticipated values of procurements so that contracts can be awarded through less transparent procedures with restricted entry. Manipulations manifest through emergence of sharp discontinuities in the anticipatedvalue distribution. Procurements excessively bunch below statutory thresholds, which determine officials? scope of discretion, entry-restrictiveness and transparency of the contract-awarding process.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Nonlinear incentive schemes and corruption in public procurement: evidence from the Czech Republic

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article uses data on Czech public procurement contracts from 2005 - 2010 in order to uncover patterns suggestive of corrupt behavior of procuring officials. Using polynomial regressions and local linear density estimators, the article provides evidence that procurement officials manipulate anticipated values of procurements so that contracts can be awarded through less transparent procedures with restricted entry. Manipulations manifest through emergence of sharp discontinuities in the anticipatedvalue distribution. Procurements excessively bunch below statutory thresholds, which determine officials? scope of discretion, entry-restrictiveness and transparency of the contract-awarding process.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů