Reactions & Debate I: On Schechtman's Person Life View

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F14%3A00074479" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/14:00074479 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/ER21.4.3062020" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/ER21.4.3062020</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/ER21.4.3062020" target="_blank" >10.2143/ER21.4.3062020</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Reactions & Debate I: On Schechtman's Person Life View

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In a recent book, Marya Schechtman argues that people are practical units whose identity is deeply interconnected with our various person-related practical concerns. The Person Life View she develops responds to a number of claims currently accepted by many scholars in the personal identity debate, including the claim that personal identity does not matter in the grounding of our person-related practical concerns, and the claim that individual practical concerns are justified by a number of different relations. Schechtman argues that personal identity does matter and that it grounds all our person-related practical concerns. I will argue that these conclusions are enabled by a series of redefinitions of established concepts made by Schechtman. I will make these redefinitions explicit. I will further argue that the Person Life View has implausible consequences both in personal ontology and in normative guidance.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Reactions & Debate I: On Schechtman's Person Life View

Popis výsledku anglicky

In a recent book, Marya Schechtman argues that people are practical units whose identity is deeply interconnected with our various person-related practical concerns. The Person Life View she develops responds to a number of claims currently accepted by many scholars in the personal identity debate, including the claim that personal identity does not matter in the grounding of our person-related practical concerns, and the claim that individual practical concerns are justified by a number of different relations. Schechtman argues that personal identity does matter and that it grounds all our person-related practical concerns. I will argue that these conclusions are enabled by a series of redefinitions of established concepts made by Schechtman. I will make these redefinitions explicit. I will further argue that the Person Life View has implausible consequences both in personal ontology and in normative guidance.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GP13-00624P" target="_blank" >GP13-00624P: Osobní identita, jednota a praktické zájmy</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Ethical Perspectives

ISSN

1370-0049

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

21

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

BE - Belgické království

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

565-579

Kód UT WoS článku

000348627500005

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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