Reason, Motive and Cause from a Wittgensteinian Perspective

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Reason, Motive and Cause from a Wittgensteinian Perspective

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We can say of an intentional action that it has a reason or a motive; and in the same vein, such an action must have a cause. It is thus only a matter of terminology whether all species of intentionality can be restated in this way?as a relation betweenan action and its motive. I argue that the distinction between a reason and a cause is a special case of the distinction between internal and external relations. This distinction allows us to analyze a metaphysical haze which is produced by confusing empirical (i.e. external) and grammatical (i.e. internal) propositions. When an agent aims to justify their action, they have several options at their disposal: (1) to give the actual cause which is always hypothetical (2) to report their actual reason, and(3) to give a possible reason which might have led to the action.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Reason, Motive and Cause from a Wittgensteinian Perspective

Popis výsledku anglicky

We can say of an intentional action that it has a reason or a motive; and in the same vein, such an action must have a cause. It is thus only a matter of terminology whether all species of intentionality can be restated in this way?as a relation betweenan action and its motive. I argue that the distinction between a reason and a cause is a special case of the distinction between internal and external relations. This distinction allows us to analyze a metaphysical haze which is produced by confusing empirical (i.e. external) and grammatical (i.e. internal) propositions. When an agent aims to justify their action, they have several options at their disposal: (1) to give the actual cause which is always hypothetical (2) to report their actual reason, and(3) to give a possible reason which might have led to the action.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Realism ? Relativism ? Constructivism. Papers of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium

ISBN

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ISSN

1022-3398

e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

3

Strana od-do

183-185

Název nakladatele

Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Místo vydání

Kirchberg am Wechsel

Místo konání akce

Kirchberg am Wechsel

Datum konání akce

1. 1. 2015

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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