D-Conception of Inference (with an Examination ofParadoxical Reasoning)

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F17%3A00113944" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/17:00113944 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

D-Conception of Inference (with an Examination ofParadoxical Reasoning)

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The talk presents an elaboration and several applications of Frege's and Tichý's two-dimensional (2D) conception of inference. In contrast to ordinary (1D) conception, each inferential step is a whole deduction and thus logical truth - not a single formula that need not to be logically valid (being mere hypothesis, assumption). 2D-conception is thus more satisfactory from an epistemological point of view. As shown by Tichý and Pezlar, reductio ad absurdum proofs cannot have a satisfactory explanation on 1D-conception. I show its 2D-explanation; similarly for indirect proofs. Moreover, a solution to the Paradox of Inference is offered.

Název v anglickém jazyce

D-Conception of Inference (with an Examination ofParadoxical Reasoning)

Popis výsledku anglicky

The talk presents an elaboration and several applications of Frege's and Tichý's two-dimensional (2D) conception of inference. In contrast to ordinary (1D) conception, each inferential step is a whole deduction and thus logical truth - not a single formula that need not to be logically valid (being mere hypothesis, assumption). 2D-conception is thus more satisfactory from an epistemological point of view. As shown by Tichý and Pezlar, reductio ad absurdum proofs cannot have a satisfactory explanation on 1D-conception. I show its 2D-explanation; similarly for indirect proofs. Moreover, a solution to the Paradox of Inference is offered.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA16-19395S" target="_blank" >GA16-19395S: Sémantické pojmy, paradoxy a hyperintenzionální logika založená na moderní rozvětvené teorii typů</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů