The Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vague Identity

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F20%3A00114528" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/20:00114528 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.kriterion-journal-of-philosophy.org/kriterion/issues/Permanent/Kriterion-belohrad-01.pdf" target="_blank" >http://www.kriterion-journal-of-philosophy.org/kriterion/issues/Permanent/Kriterion-belohrad-01.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vague Identity

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper focuses on Jessica Wilson’s determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy and its relationship to the concept of vague identity. The determinable-based account comprises a distinction between meta-level and object-level accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy. I first argue that the distinction cannot be clearly applied to some theories. In particular, I argue that even though Wilson categorizes the constitution account of metaphysical indeterminacy as a meta-level account, from one perspective it can be defensibly regarded as an object-level account, because it is bound to posit genuinely indeterminate states of affairs and provides an explanation of boundary indeterminacy that is structurally analogous to the explanation provided by Wilson’s object-level account. This interim conclusion is important, because it has been argued that the constitution account, when applied to some more complex types of boundary indeterminacy, cannot avoid commitment to vague identity, in spite of the declarations of some of its proponents. The ultimate goal of this paper is to argue that, contrary to Wilson’s claims, the determinable-based account must embrace vague identity too.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vague Identity

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper focuses on Jessica Wilson’s determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy and its relationship to the concept of vague identity. The determinable-based account comprises a distinction between meta-level and object-level accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy. I first argue that the distinction cannot be clearly applied to some theories. In particular, I argue that even though Wilson categorizes the constitution account of metaphysical indeterminacy as a meta-level account, from one perspective it can be defensibly regarded as an object-level account, because it is bound to posit genuinely indeterminate states of affairs and provides an explanation of boundary indeterminacy that is structurally analogous to the explanation provided by Wilson’s object-level account. This interim conclusion is important, because it has been argued that the constitution account, when applied to some more complex types of boundary indeterminacy, cannot avoid commitment to vague identity, in spite of the declarations of some of its proponents. The ultimate goal of this paper is to argue that, contrary to Wilson’s claims, the determinable-based account must embrace vague identity too.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA17-12551S" target="_blank" >GA17-12551S: Neurčitá identita</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy

ISSN

1019-8288

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

34

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

23-50

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85142097745