Reverberating the Glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity in Hegel’s Logic of the Concept

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F22%3A00118757" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/22:00118757 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.24" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.24</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.24" target="_blank" >10.1017/hgl.2020.24</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Reverberating the Glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity in Hegel’s Logic of the Concept

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Understanding Hegel’s account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida’s analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel’s neologism beiherspielen, in which Beispiel is understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). A Beispiel in the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida’s view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou’s concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel’s claim that the movement of the concept is play.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Reverberating the Glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity in Hegel’s Logic of the Concept

Popis výsledku anglicky

Understanding Hegel’s account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida’s analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel’s neologism beiherspielen, in which Beispiel is understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). A Beispiel in the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida’s view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou’s concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel’s claim that the movement of the concept is play.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA19-16680S" target="_blank" >GA19-16680S: Paradigmatické myšlení: singularita, universalita, sebe-reference</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Hegel Bulletin

ISSN

2051-5367

e-ISSN

2051-5375

Svazek periodika

43

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

19

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

93-120

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85130224074