Differential cost-benefit estimation stabilizes cooperative benefits of commitment signals

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F25%3A00144468" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/25:00144468 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.lorentzcenter.nl/honest-signalling-and-communication-from-microbes-to-humans.html" target="_blank" >https://www.lorentzcenter.nl/honest-signalling-and-communication-from-microbes-to-humans.html</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Differential cost-benefit estimation stabilizes cooperative benefits of commitment signals

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Extreme rituals and similar costly conventions are traditionally explained as commitment signals that assort dedicated individuals. However, it is unclear why outsiders would not fake such signals-participate in rituals-and free-ride on the cooperative effort of committed members. We propose that biases in signal value computation promote the cooperative functions. In three pre-registered studies (total N = 1,341, general US population), we first showed in an artificial setting that committed individuals assort by overestimating signal benefits, although free-riders faking the signal earned the most. Using a real-world identity-religious affiliation-the second study demonstrated that highly costly religious signals deter outsiders, making religious cooperation profitable and resistant to free-riders. Finally, the third study revealed that religious signals were perceived by committed members to bring additional benefits that were not perceived by outsiders. This differential benefit estimation explains why highly costly signals such as extreme rituals persist and promote cooperation.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Differential cost-benefit estimation stabilizes cooperative benefits of commitment signals

Popis výsledku anglicky

Extreme rituals and similar costly conventions are traditionally explained as commitment signals that assort dedicated individuals. However, it is unclear why outsiders would not fake such signals-participate in rituals-and free-ride on the cooperative effort of committed members. We propose that biases in signal value computation promote the cooperative functions. In three pre-registered studies (total N = 1,341, general US population), we first showed in an artificial setting that committed individuals assort by overestimating signal benefits, although free-riders faking the signal earned the most. Using a real-world identity-religious affiliation-the second study demonstrated that highly costly religious signals deter outsiders, making religious cooperation profitable and resistant to free-riders. Finally, the third study revealed that religious signals were perceived by committed members to bring additional benefits that were not perceived by outsiders. This differential benefit estimation explains why highly costly signals such as extreme rituals persist and promote cooperation.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60304 - Religious studies

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA23-05655S" target="_blank" >GA23-05655S: Psychologie signalizace: Výzkum komputací umožňujících kooperativní komunikaci</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů