Cyber Weapons Review in Situations Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F20%3A00115669" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/20:00115669 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/05/CyCon_2020_book.pdf" target="_blank" >https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/05/CyCon_2020_book.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Cyber Weapons Review in Situations Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The use of cyber weapons raises many issues, one of which is the scope of legal requirements affecting the legal review of cyber weapons under Additional Protocol I and customary international law. This paper explores the review of cyber weapons intended for use below the threshold of armed conflict. As the line between war and peace is often increasingly blurred and the majority of cyber incidents are below the threshold of armed conflict, the laws and principles of international humanitarian law do not apply. In this paper, we engage in a scenariobased thought experiment exploring the legal framework affecting the use of cyber weapons outside armed conflict. In such situations, the well-known article 36 of Additional Protocol I and customary international law are not triggered. As a result, there is no explicit legal obligation to conduct a cyber weapons review in situations when cyber weapons are deployed in situations falling below the threshold of armed conflict. Our starting point is that even though international humanitarian law is not applicable, the use of cyber weapons is not completely unregulated. In the paper, we search for answer to following research question: what are the legal requirements for weapons review in situations where their intended use is for situations below the threshold of armed conflict? We identify the black-letter legal framework and explore the state practice of NATO member states where available. The paper argues that there are many obligations to be considered when deploying cyber weapons in situations below the threshold of armed conflict. The conclusion is that there is no obligation to conduct a review outside Article 36 of Additional Protocol I. That being said, there are definitely policy benefits in conducting broader software assessment to ensure respect to international law obligations of a state.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Cyber Weapons Review in Situations Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict

Popis výsledku anglicky

The use of cyber weapons raises many issues, one of which is the scope of legal requirements affecting the legal review of cyber weapons under Additional Protocol I and customary international law. This paper explores the review of cyber weapons intended for use below the threshold of armed conflict. As the line between war and peace is often increasingly blurred and the majority of cyber incidents are below the threshold of armed conflict, the laws and principles of international humanitarian law do not apply. In this paper, we engage in a scenariobased thought experiment exploring the legal framework affecting the use of cyber weapons outside armed conflict. In such situations, the well-known article 36 of Additional Protocol I and customary international law are not triggered. As a result, there is no explicit legal obligation to conduct a cyber weapons review in situations when cyber weapons are deployed in situations falling below the threshold of armed conflict. Our starting point is that even though international humanitarian law is not applicable, the use of cyber weapons is not completely unregulated. In the paper, we search for answer to following research question: what are the legal requirements for weapons review in situations where their intended use is for situations below the threshold of armed conflict? We identify the black-letter legal framework and explore the state practice of NATO member states where available. The paper argues that there are many obligations to be considered when deploying cyber weapons in situations below the threshold of armed conflict. The conclusion is that there is no obligation to conduct a review outside Article 36 of Additional Protocol I. That being said, there are definitely policy benefits in conducting broader software assessment to ensure respect to international law obligations of a state.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF16_019%2F0000822" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000822: Centrum excelence pro kyberkriminalitu, kyberbezpečnost a ochranu kritických informačních infrastruktur</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

2020 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict 20/20 Vision: The Next Decade

ISBN

9789949990467

ISSN

2325-5366

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

97-112

Název nakladatele

NATO CCDCOE Publications

Místo vydání

Tallinn

Místo konání akce

Tallinn

Datum konání akce

1. 1. 2020

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

000615995100006