How to Fight Court-Packing
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F20%3A00115855" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/20:00115855 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://constitutionalstudies.wisc.edu/index.php/cs/article/view/52" target="_blank" >https://constitutionalstudies.wisc.edu/index.php/cs/article/view/52</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
How to Fight Court-Packing
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Whether we like it or not, court-packing has flourished all over the world. Bolivian, Hungarian, Polish, and Turkish as well as Venezuelan political leaders have recently employed various strategies to stack their courts with loyal judges. Even in consolidated democracies, such as the United States, the possibility of court-packing is discussed with an intensity unheard of for several decades. Yet, our conceptual understanding of the phenomenon is still very limited. This article provides a novel conceptualization of court-packing and identifies three court-packing strategies: (1) the expanding strategy, which includes techniques that increase the size of the court; (2) the emptying strategy, which results in a decrease in the number of sitting judges; and (3) the swapping strategy, which aims at replacing sitting judges. Subsequently, it analyzes the potential safeguards, both formal and informal, against court-packing strategies and shows that formal institutions are rarely enough to fend off court-packing attempts.
Název v anglickém jazyce
How to Fight Court-Packing
Popis výsledku anglicky
Whether we like it or not, court-packing has flourished all over the world. Bolivian, Hungarian, Polish, and Turkish as well as Venezuelan political leaders have recently employed various strategies to stack their courts with loyal judges. Even in consolidated democracies, such as the United States, the possibility of court-packing is discussed with an intensity unheard of for several decades. Yet, our conceptual understanding of the phenomenon is still very limited. This article provides a novel conceptualization of court-packing and identifies three court-packing strategies: (1) the expanding strategy, which includes techniques that increase the size of the court; (2) the emptying strategy, which results in a decrease in the number of sitting judges; and (3) the swapping strategy, which aims at replacing sitting judges. Subsequently, it analyzes the potential safeguards, both formal and informal, against court-packing strategies and shows that formal institutions are rarely enough to fend off court-packing attempts.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>ost</sub> - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích
CEP obor
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OECD FORD obor
50501 - Law
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
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Návaznosti
R - Projekt Ramcoveho programu EK
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2020
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Constitutional Studies
ISSN
2474-9427
e-ISSN
2474-9419
Svazek periodika
6
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
1
Stát vydavatele periodika
US - Spojené státy americké
Počet stran výsledku
32
Strana od-do
133-164
Kód UT WoS článku
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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
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