Metaethics of Human Rights: An Expressivist Approach

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F20%3A00118771" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/20:00118771 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://elibrary.duncker-humblot.com/journals/id/30/" target="_blank" >https://elibrary.duncker-humblot.com/journals/id/30/</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Metaethics of Human Rights: An Expressivist Approach

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Moral objectivity can be understood in different ways. I will compare two approaches here. The metaphysical realism presupposes a strong conception of moral objectivity. According to this view, human rights are not only morally justified claims of people, but they are somehow built into the world itself. On the other hand, the expressivism prefers a weaker conception of moral objectivity which can be explained by the very nature of moral reasoning. In any process of moral justification, speakers express their moral attitudes that presuppose the claim to objectivity. The disadvantage of metaphysical realism is the epistemic uncertainty about the existence and content of moral reality. This permanent doubt has a perilous potential to slip into deep moral scepticism. I will conclude that human rights are objective at least in the weaker sense. The objectivity of human rights is nothing supernatural, it is an entirely human matter. This weak conception of objectivity is not encoded in non-natural reality, but rather in the way we think and talk about human rights.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Metaethics of Human Rights: An Expressivist Approach

Popis výsledku anglicky

Moral objectivity can be understood in different ways. I will compare two approaches here. The metaphysical realism presupposes a strong conception of moral objectivity. According to this view, human rights are not only morally justified claims of people, but they are somehow built into the world itself. On the other hand, the expressivism prefers a weaker conception of moral objectivity which can be explained by the very nature of moral reasoning. In any process of moral justification, speakers express their moral attitudes that presuppose the claim to objectivity. The disadvantage of metaphysical realism is the epistemic uncertainty about the existence and content of moral reality. This permanent doubt has a perilous potential to slip into deep moral scepticism. I will conclude that human rights are objective at least in the weaker sense. The objectivity of human rights is nothing supernatural, it is an entirely human matter. This weak conception of objectivity is not encoded in non-natural reality, but rather in the way we think and talk about human rights.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-10464S" target="_blank" >GA20-10464S: Kontextuální vazby justifikace lidských práv jako problém právní filosofie</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Rechtstheorie

ISSN

0034-1398

e-ISSN

1865-519X

Svazek periodika

50

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

27

Strana od-do

493-519

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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