Consequentialism and Problem of Role Morality in Legal Ethics

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F23%3A00136347" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/23:00136347 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://is.muni.cz/publication/2415882/cs" target="_blank" >https://is.muni.cz/publication/2415882/cs</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2024.2341348" target="_blank" >10.1080/1460728x.2024.2341348</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Consequentialism and Problem of Role Morality in Legal Ethics

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

One of the frequent philosophical problems of legal ethics is the conflict between common and role morality. This situation is where a lawyer's actions are evaluated differently by these two sets of moral norms. The article seizes on this as a conflict between two conventional moralities that need to be resolved with the help of a justificatory morality and thus an appropriate theory of normative ethics. It offers as a possible response a variant of consequentialism that draws on utilitarianism and brings it closer to pragmatism. This approach seeks to preserve the traditional advantages of utilitarianism, which are minimalist and plausible normative assumptions, and an excellent ability to resolve moral conflicts. At the same time, it takes into account the complex nature of the world in which we live and our epistemic uncertainty, which brings it closer to pragmatism. The author confronts this theory with some existing approaches to resolving the conflict between the common and role morality and tries to show that it is at least as plausible as they are and should have a place among them. Finally, the article concludes with an analysis of the famous case of Alton Logan as its practical application.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Consequentialism and Problem of Role Morality in Legal Ethics

Popis výsledku anglicky

One of the frequent philosophical problems of legal ethics is the conflict between common and role morality. This situation is where a lawyer's actions are evaluated differently by these two sets of moral norms. The article seizes on this as a conflict between two conventional moralities that need to be resolved with the help of a justificatory morality and thus an appropriate theory of normative ethics. It offers as a possible response a variant of consequentialism that draws on utilitarianism and brings it closer to pragmatism. This approach seeks to preserve the traditional advantages of utilitarianism, which are minimalist and plausible normative assumptions, and an excellent ability to resolve moral conflicts. At the same time, it takes into account the complex nature of the world in which we live and our epistemic uncertainty, which brings it closer to pragmatism. The author confronts this theory with some existing approaches to resolving the conflict between the common and role morality and tries to show that it is at least as plausible as they are and should have a place among them. Finally, the article concludes with an analysis of the famous case of Alton Logan as its practical application.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Legal Ethics

ISSN

1460-728X

e-ISSN

1757-8450

Svazek periodika

26

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

183-200

Kód UT WoS článku

001204602700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85191016344