Právní význam v teorii Michaela S. Moora a právní jistota

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F24%3A00140111" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/24:00140111 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

čeština

Název v původním jazyce

Právní význam v teorii Michaela S. Moora a právní jistota

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The article examines the meaning of legal expressions in Michale S. Moore‘s theory in the context of its influence on the theory of legal certainty. After outlining the theoretical background of Moore‘s theory and summarizing realist semantics built on a causal theory of meaning, I focus on an exposition of the theory of functional kinds as meanings of legal expressions and the connection between realist semantics, the objectivity of law, and the truth of legal propositions. I then discuss two implications that are intended to favor realist semantics over competing theories, the explication of the change in meaning of the same expression in the face of disagreement and the connection of functional (and other) kinds to the determinacy of legal discourse. I criticize both implications, and especially their contribution to the standard theory of legal certainty, because I think they do not deal with straightforward epistemological objections. On the basis of this analysis, I reconstruct a preferred theory of legal certainty for realists, but present alongside it an alternative theory responsive to the previous criticisms. I evaluate both theories in terms of their immediate applicability and show how they might be integrated side by side.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Legal meaning in Michale S. Moore‘s theory and legal certanity

Popis výsledku anglicky

The article examines the meaning of legal expressions in Michale S. Moore‘s theory in the context of its influence on the theory of legal certainty. After outlining the theoretical background of Moore‘s theory and summarizing realist semantics built on a causal theory of meaning, I focus on an exposition of the theory of functional kinds as meanings of legal expressions and the connection between realist semantics, the objectivity of law, and the truth of legal propositions. I then discuss two implications that are intended to favor realist semantics over competing theories, the explication of the change in meaning of the same expression in the face of disagreement and the connection of functional (and other) kinds to the determinacy of legal discourse. I criticize both implications, and especially their contribution to the standard theory of legal certainty, because I think they do not deal with straightforward epistemological objections. On the basis of this analysis, I reconstruct a preferred theory of legal certainty for realists, but present alongside it an alternative theory responsive to the previous criticisms. I evaluate both theories in terms of their immediate applicability and show how they might be integrated side by side.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Ratio Publica

ISSN

2787-9550

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

4

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

70-84

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105003692203