Party based Euroscepticism and EU domestic coordination : longitudinal analysis of central and eastern countries

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F18%3A00103431" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/18:00103431 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21599165.2018.1503594?journalCode=fjcs21" target="_blank" >https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21599165.2018.1503594?journalCode=fjcs21</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1503594" target="_blank" >10.1080/21599165.2018.1503594</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Party based Euroscepticism and EU domestic coordination : longitudinal analysis of central and eastern countries

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article is concerned with the positions of political actors on European Union (EU) issues and examines how these positions impact the coordination of the European agenda. Theoretically, the analysis is based on a model in which political actors maximise their preferences, as developed in rational-choice institutionalism. The authors use two dependent variables: “form of coordination”, which denotes the centralisation or decentralisation of systems; and “centre of coordination”, which indicates the location within government of the main coordinating body. They seek to explain: 1) party Euroscepticism and the degree of salience governments assign to their European agenda; and 2) other factors including party system fragmentation and political system decentralisation. The findings confirm the premise that party Euroscepticism and the salience of EU issues lead to the centralisation of coordination mechanisms. By contrast, the study refutes the hypothesis that the European agenda is externalised to the ministry of foreign affairs if the cabinet is a Eurosceptic one.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Party based Euroscepticism and EU domestic coordination : longitudinal analysis of central and eastern countries

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article is concerned with the positions of political actors on European Union (EU) issues and examines how these positions impact the coordination of the European agenda. Theoretically, the analysis is based on a model in which political actors maximise their preferences, as developed in rational-choice institutionalism. The authors use two dependent variables: “form of coordination”, which denotes the centralisation or decentralisation of systems; and “centre of coordination”, which indicates the location within government of the main coordinating body. They seek to explain: 1) party Euroscepticism and the degree of salience governments assign to their European agenda; and 2) other factors including party system fragmentation and political system decentralisation. The findings confirm the premise that party Euroscepticism and the salience of EU issues lead to the centralisation of coordination mechanisms. By contrast, the study refutes the hypothesis that the European agenda is externalised to the ministry of foreign affairs if the cabinet is a Eurosceptic one.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

East European Politics

ISSN

2159-9165

e-ISSN

2159-9173

Svazek periodika

34

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

440-457

Kód UT WoS článku

000457601600004

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85052116133